Enterprise risk management: A process for enhanced management and improved performance by Gates, Stephen et al.
Enterprise risk management: A process for enhanced
management and improved performance
Stephen Gates, Jean-Louis Nicolas, Paul L. Walker
To cite this version:
Stephen Gates, Jean-Louis Nicolas, Paul L. Walker. Enterprise risk management: A process for
enhanced management and improved performance. Management Accounting Quarterly, 2012,
13 (3), pp.28-38. <hal-00857435>
HAL Id: hal-00857435
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00857435
Submitted on 3 Sep 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
28M A N A G E M E N T  A C C O U N T I N G  Q U A R T E R L Y S P R I N G  2 0 1 2 ,  V O L .  1 3 ,  N O .  3
R
isk management is an important topic in
today’s business environment. One approach
that is being heavily advocated—and even
mandated in some places—is enterprise risk
management (ERM), a “process” that can
help a company identify risk events and manage the
related risks.1 Whether it’s coming from the U.S. Secu-
rities & Exchange Commission (SEC), U.S. and foreign
stock exchange regulations, legal court cases, or even
Standard & Poor’s decision to incorporate a company’s
ERM efforts into its company ratings, increased pres-
sure is being placed on companies around the world to
identify and manage their risks. In the United States,
the SEC passed Rule 33-9089 in 2009, which mandated
risk oversight by company boards of directors. Coun-
tries such as South Africa, the United Kingdom, and
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Australia have all moved toward requiring or strongly
suggesting that companies adopt some form of ERM.
As this movement grows, however, there is still uncer-
tainty about the effects of ERM and how the process
creates added value.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND
THE COSO FRAMEWORK
Despite the growing interest in ERM, there exists little
research examining its value. Early field-based research
in 2002 revealed how major U.S. companies such as
Microsoft and Walmart try to manage their risks.2 Fur-
ther studies followed that focused on ERM determi-
nants or adoption and ERM disclosures.3 In 2009, two
studies attempted to determine ERM’s added value by
quantifying it through a cost-benefit approach: Laurent
Cappelletti illustrated a method to calculate the hidden
costs of the lack of internal control and risk manage-
ment, and Brian Ballou, Dan Heitger, and Thomas
Schultz described the direct and indirect costs of reduc-
ing risks and suggested how companies can better align
the net benefits of reducing risks with their risk
appetites.4
While quantifying the cost-benefit of ERM demon-
strates its value, another approach is to show how ERM
can help an organization attain strategic goals. For
example, in separate studies, William G. Shenkir and
Paul. L. Walker and Mark Beasley, Al Chen, Karen
Nunez, and Lorraine Wright demonstrated how a com-
pany can leverage the balanced scorecard to support an
ERM view of risk.5 In a survey of executives and man-
agers, Ananth Rao and Attiea Marie found dissatisfac-
tion with the link between ERM and strategy and pro-
posed a strategic approach to ERM that focuses on 
the impact that risks have on key performance
indicators.6
In 2009, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) reinforced the
strategic approach to ERM by emphasizing the contri-
bution it can make to delivering on a company’s strate-
gic goals.7 Starting with the definition of ERM as “a
process, effected by the entity’s board of directors, man-
agement, and other personnel, applied in strategy set-
ting and across the enterprise...,” COSO recommended
four practices focused on the interaction between man-
agement and the board of directors:
1. Discuss risk management philosophy and risk
appetite,
2. Understand risk management practices,
3. Review portfolio risks in relation to risk appetite,
and
4. Be apprised of the most significant risks and risk
responses.
In light of the SEC’s Rule 33-9089, COSO’s four
practices provide helpful guidelines to demonstrate that
boards are fulfilling this fiduciary duty. Nevertheless,
three recent surveys of board members reported major
gaps. A survey from KPMG’s Audit Committee Insti-
tute revealed the top concern of the board’s audit com-
mittee was the link between strategy and risk.8 Con-
cerning each of the four COSO recommendations, the
survey results showed:
1. Few organizations have developed risk-appetite
statements,
2. Boards have limited information regarding actual
ERM practices,
3. Organizations are moving to ERM by integrating
risks across business units and risk types, and
4. Boards are not sufficiently informed regarding key
risks and potential responses.
Curiously, while 70% of respondents wanted more
information about strategic risks, two-thirds of the
board members considered the information effective for
their risk management duties.
In another survey, Mark Beasley, Bruce Branson, and
Bonnie Hancock reported that a significant percentage
of respondents indicated that there were either no
processes or minimal ones in place to identify or track
emerging risks, and an even lower percentage of
respondents stated that their companies monitor key
risk indicators.9 To explain why risk oversight processes
remain immature, these board members maintained
that management does not see the interconnectivity of
risk oversight and strategy execution.
Two reasons for the lack of improvement in risk
oversight are the uncertainty surrounding the value
proposition of investing more in risk management
(which is viewed as a compliance activity, not a strategic
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one) and management’s and the board’s overconfidence
in their company’s current approach to risk oversight.
Another obstacle was found in a study commissioned in
2010 by COSO, in which board members indicated that
the top obstacle to improving risk oversight was that
there were more pressing needs.10
The result is that many board members are only
reluctantly carrying out their duties to oversee risk—
despite the increasing legal requirements to demon-
strate that they are carrying out their risk oversight fidu-
ciary duty. Boards and management want to know that
ERM adds value—and how it does so—before they will
embrace it.11 Early research shows that risk manage-
ment adds value by removing lower tail outcomes.12 It
also leads to better efficiency, better understanding of
risks, a better basis for resource allocation, reduced
earnings volatility (via aggregation as opposed to a sin-
gle source), decreased regulatory costs, and better trans-
parency with outsiders.13
ERM SURVEY
COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Frame-
work details eight components to help a company both
manage risk and provide reasonable assurance about
meeting objectives: internal environment, objective
setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk
response, control activities, information and communi-
cation, and monitoring. Companies publicly provide
the most information on the internal environment,
objective setting, event identification, and risk assess-
ment components. The tendency to disclose these
components is most likely because they occur early in
an ERM process. Information is generally harder to
find regarding companies’ practices related to risk
response, control activities, information and communi-
cation, and monitoring.
With advice from risk management consulting pro-
fessionals, we designed a survey of corporate ERM
practices to study the practical value side of ERM. The
survey questions measured the following components
of ERM: objective setting, risk identification, risk reac-
tion, oversight, information and communication, inter-
nal environment, management, and performance. (Risk
identification is a combination of the risk response and
risk assessment COSO components, while observation
is a combination of the control activities and monitoring
components.) Table 1 shows the survey measures
grouped by their related components. We used multiple
measures for each component. For example, we cap-
tured the performance component through the survey
responses to questions about risk-adjusted performance,
meeting strategic goals, reduced earnings volatility, and
increased profitability.
During the summer of 2004, we sent 1,000 surveys to
audit and risk management executives from companies
that are members of The Conference Board. The
advantage of this timeframe is that it predates the cur-
rent global economic recession. ERM value may be eas-
ier to capture and understand during this earlier time-
frame rather than in the middle of a global economic
crisis that contains substantial systemic risk.
After a second mailing and telephone follow-up, we
had received 271 surveys, a 27% response rate, which is
in line with other surveys of internal auditors.14 Since
121 respondents reported that their company was either
in the planning stage or had not considered implement-
ing an ERM system, the final sample was 150
companies.
The survey also asked about organizational character-
istics. We included four control variables in the survey.
Revenue was a proxy for company size, and business con-
trolled for industry differences. Country captured the
country in which the business operates, and ERM stage
controlled how far along the company has advanced in
their ERM process. (Research shows industry influ-
ences the stage of ERM, and U.S. firms are not as
advanced as non-U.S. firms in ERM development.15) In
regard to the control variables, here are some statistics
related to respondents’ companies:
u 40% were in the fields of energy, financial services,
banking, or insurance,
u 55% of had reported revenue of more than $5 billion,
u 57% were in the U.S., and
u 59% were implementing ERM or maintaining and
monitoring it.
HYPOTHESES
We devised seven hypotheses to be tested. Each
hypothesis is related to the structured component
approach.
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Table 1. ERM Components and Related Survey Measures
Component Survey Item
1. Has aligned its business risks with its corporate-level and business-unit-level goals and objectives
2. Has established explicit, corporate-wide risk tolerance levels or limits for all major risk categories
3. Has clearly communicated its expectations for risk-taking to senior managers
1. Has established a comprehensive business risk inventory of the risks you expect your managers to manage
2. Its business units utilize facilitated self-assessment and/or survey techniques to map risks
1. Conducts formal risk assessment across the company on a regular basis
2. Its business units analyze the root cause, impact, and interrelationships of its risks
3. Has quantified its key risk to the best extent possible
4. Has a process to integrate the effects of the major risk types (strategic, operational, financial, hazard, and
legal)
5. Its business units develop and determine risk mitigation strategies
1. Has established written risk policy and procedure manuals that are consistent across major risks 
2. Its business units monitor and report on current status of managing key risks
3. Has identified the key metrics required for reporting on risk management performance
1. Has a corporate-wide common language for communicating risk-type exposures, control activities, and moni-
toring efforts
2. Has regular briefs to the board and executive committee on risk management issues
1. Has communicated a risk management mission statement, value proposition, and benefits statement to senior
managers
2. Has incorporated responsibility for risk management into the position description of all managers
3. Board of directors or committee of the board is actively involved in the risk management process
1. Perceived benefit of ERM on company’s general management consensus
2. Perceived benefit of ERM on company’s ability to make better-informed decisions
3. Perceived benefit of ERM on company’s ability to articulate and communicate risk taking to the management
board and outside stakeholders
4. Perceived benefit of ERM on increased company management accountability
1. Perceived benefit of ERM to measure risk-adjusted performance among business units
2. Perceived benefit of ERM to increase ability to meet strategic goals
3. Perceived benefit of ERM to reduce earnings volatility
4. Perceived benefit of ERM to increase profitability
Objective setting
Identification
Risk reaction
Oversight
Information and
Communication
Internal
environment
Management
Performance
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Objective Setting
As one of the first steps in an ERM process, setting
objectives is a precondition to such components as risk
identification, risk assessment, and risk response. Most
ERM frameworks state that risks should be identified
based on the company’s objectives. COSO’s Framework
notes that these objectives should align with a compa-
ny’s risk appetite and tolerance levels. We used three
indicators to capture how companies aligned risks with
objectives, established risk-tolerance levels, and com-
municated risk expectations. Since setting objectives
should be an important first step that leads to risk iden-
tification, we believe there will be a significant associa-
tion between these constructs. That leads to the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A positive association exists
between objective setting and risk identifica-
tion, i.e., better objective setting leads to better
risk identification.
Risk Identification
An organization should try to identify the risks related
to its objectives. We used two indicators to capture risk
identification. The first is related to the use of a com-
prehensive risk inventory. For example, COSO states
that companies might use risk-event categories. The
second indicator is whether the company utilizes assess-
ments or surveys to map identified risks. According to
COSO and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), there are numerous ways compa-
nies can identify risks.16 Clearly, companies must first
identify their risks before they can react to them, and
this leads to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A positive association exists
between risk identification and risk reaction.
Risk Reaction
Companies can react to identified risks in a variety of
ways. We built the risk reaction construct to encompass
the two related components of risk assessment and risk
response. Risk assessment, where companies assess
identified risks along the dimensions of impact and
likelihood, considers data sources, varying perspectives,
qualitative and quantitative techniques, and the rela-
tionships between events. We used three indicators of
risk assessment: conducting formal risk assessments,
analyzing root cause and impact, and quantifying risk.
Companies should respond and react to their assess-
ments because they have more and better knowledge.
Response techniques included risk avoidance, risk
reduction, risk sharing, and risk acceptance. We used
two indicators of risk response. The first indicator
addresses having a process to integrate the effects of
the risks; the second indicator examines risk-mitigation
strategies. As companies begin to assess and quantify
risk, analyze the root cause, integrate risks, and develop
mitigation strategies, we believe this should have an
impact on management’s ability to oversee risks:
Hypothesis 3: A positive association exists
between risk reaction and risk oversight.
Oversight
After companies have established objectives, identified
risks, and developed a risk reaction, they can develop
control activities and monitoring procedures. For
simplicity, we combined the two COSO ERM
components—control activities and monitoring—into
one ERM construct—oversight. SEC Rule 33-9089
mandates the disclosure of risk oversight. Control activ-
ities are typically the policies and procedures a com-
pany uses, and monitoring is the “ongoing management
activities.” Our indicators in these areas cover policy
and procedure manuals, actual business-unit monitor-
ing, and identification of related metrics. Companies
with the right controls, metrics, monitoring, and over-
sight in place should have better information than they
had before implementing an ERM process:
Hypothesis 4: A positive relationship exists
between oversight and information and
communication.
Information and Communication
According to COSO, “information and communication”
means that companies identify and communicate rele-
vant information. It also means that information is iden-
tified at all levels across the company, so a company not
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only identifies risks but assesses them and develops a
proper response. We used indicators that address both a
common risk language for communicating and provid-
ing regular briefs to the board and executives. We
expect that better information and communication will
impact the company’s internal environment:
Hypothesis 5: A positive relationship exists
between information and communication and
the internal environment.
Internal Environment, Management, 
and Performance
The internal environment component captures the tra-
ditional idea of the “tone at the top,” but it includes
much more, such as risk consciousness, risk appetite,
risk philosophy, and board oversight. We used three
proxies for internal environment under an ERM frame-
work: having a risk mission statement, including risk in
job responsibilities, and having the board involved in
risk management efforts. This emphasis and environ-
ment leads to an increased management focus. In 2011,
the SEC’s director of the Office of Compliance Inspec-
tions and Examinations stated that the business and
supporting functions (ethics, risk management office,
and internal audit) are the first lines of defense and that
senior management reinforcing the tone and culture is
the next line of defense.17
COSO noted that management decisions create val-
ue and enhance performance. For example, manage-
ment needs to consider the risk appetite, set objectives,
identify risks, identify risk responses, consider risk
alternatives, assess capital needs for the risks, etc. To
capture management decisions, we used four indicators
to address whether the company now has greater man-
agement consensus, makes better-informed decisions,
better communicates risk to the board and shareholders,
and has increased accountability.
Both COSO and ISO support the idea of value being
part of an ERM process. According to COSO, a compa-
ny maximizes value when management sets strategy to
balance growth and risks and when management cor-
rectly uses resources as it pursues objectives and man-
ages the related risk. The central idea is that value is
created, and, therefore, performance is enhanced. Our
indicators of performance included risk-adjusted perfor-
mance, increased ability to meeting strategic goals,
reduced earnings volatility, and increased profitability.
COSO notes that value is created and performance is
enhanced by management decisions. Examples of the
decisions made by management include considering the
risk appetite, setting objectives, identifying risks, iden-
tifying risk responses, considering risk alternatives, and
assessing capital needs for the risks. Therefore, our sec-
ond construct captures management decisions. We use
four indicators of enhanced management. The indica-
tors address whether the company now has greater
management consensus, makes better-informed deci-
sions, communicates risk better (to the board and share-
holders), and has increased accountability. The
hypotheses for the internal environment, management,
and performance constructs are:
Hypothesis 6: A positive relationship exists
between internal environment and
management.
Hypothesis 7: A positive relationship exists
between management and performance.
RESEARCH RESULTS
To test the hypotheses, we utilized a partial least
squares (PLS) analysis (PLS PM Version 2008). PLS
explains variance among a large number of indicators
for each latent variable even for relatively small sam-
ples. Since our sample size (n=150) was relatively small,
the PLS analytical technique was a good fit.
Using a statistical technique called the reflective
method, we elaborated the “synthetic” latent variables,
represented by the eight components of the COSO
ERM framework, from the survey questions, which
take the name of manifest variables. An exploratory
analysis revealed the variables with the most explanato-
ry power, and the PLS analysis then measured the
direct and indirect effects between the latent variables,
confirming or invalidating the theoretical model. Figure 1
summarizes the constructs and hypotheses for the
research model. Each of the ERM concepts is named
and hypothesized to have a direct influence on the sub-
sequent ERM concept, as expressed in our hypotheses,
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which are generated from the logical, linear causal chain
of ERM (from objective setting to identifying risks to
risk reaction to oversight to information and communi-
cation to internal environment and, finally, their cumu-
lative impact on management decisions and, ultimately,
performance). Figure 1 also shows that risk reaction is
based on risk assessment and risk response and that
oversight is based on control activities and monitoring.
These two compound ERM concepts simplify the
model, but do not reduce its explanatory power.
Each ERM concept’s underlying variables is shown
in Table 1. We measured the underlying variables on a
five-point scale (with 1 as the lowest and 5 as the high-
est). From a statistical modeling perspective, all factor
loadings and reliability values are satisfactory. These
results validate our model.18
The first five hypotheses concern the initial linear,
cumulative aspects of ERM. The results from the sur-
vey are statistically significant for all five hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 posits a positive association between
objective setting and risk identification, which is sup-
ported (b = 0.65, p < 0.001). Firms that align risks with
objectives are better at risk identification.19 When risks
are viewed from a company-wide perspective and risk
tolerances or limits are clearly defined and communicat-
ed throughout the hierarchy, it is easier to create an
inventory of risks and for individual business units to
implement the tools to evaluate and monitor these
risks.
Hypothesis 2 posits a positive association between
risk identification and risk reaction, which is supported
(b = 0.67, p < 0.001). It is easier and more effective to
react to risks if management has enumerated the possi-
ble risks along with the means to evaluate and quantify
them. This facilitates discovering the root causes of
these risks and the strategies needed to manage them.
Hypothesis 3 posits a positive association between
risk reaction and oversight of risks, which is supported
(b = 0.74, p < 0.001). Oversight gets better as risk reac-
tion (root causes, assessments, etc.) improves. This
phase involves formalizing written procedures for man-
aging and monitoring major risks. The business units
monitor and report on the status of key risks, and over-
sight gets better as risk reaction improves.
Hypothesis 4 posits a positive association between
oversight and information and communication, which is
supported (b = 0.74, p < 0.001). Thanks to these indica-
tors, the company uses a common language to commu-
nicate about the range of risk exposure, the control
activities, and the piloting of these efforts. Risk briefs to
the board and executives improve as oversight
improves.
Hypothesis 5 posits a positive association between
information and communication and the internal envi-
ronment, which is supported (b = 0.78, p < 0.001). As
better risk information and communication is available,
the internal environment improves and enables incor-
porating risk into mission statements and job responsi-
bilities. Improved risk information and communication
is also associated with a more active board.
The significance of the linear relationship between
the first five hypotheses is important. Companies need
to manage their risks and improve. As the model con-
firms, that leads to improved performance when compa-
nies first identify the risks associated with their objec-
tives. That step is closely followed by reacting to the
risk (e.g., assessing the risks) and then building an over-
sight and information process, which leads to an
improved internal environment. Companies that try to
build oversight and information processes that are not
linked to the risk and objective aspects of the process
may be less likely to get improved performance. This
linear juxtaposition of the components of ERM shows
that the value of ERM increases as these components
are put in place.
Moreover, the linear juxtaposition of ERM compo-
nents has a cumulative impact. As shown in Table 2,
the total cumulative effect of the ERM components on
internal environment is equal to the direct effect—that
is, the influence of information and communication on
internal environment—plus the indirect effects of each
ERM component (objective setting, risk identification,
risk reaction, oversight) on internal environment. Table 2
shows that these indirect effects on internal environ-
ment rise in a cumulative fashion at each successive
ERM component. The indirect effects measure each
latent variable’s relative influence on the internal envi-
ronment construct. In sum, the internal environment
component of ERM is directly impacted by the infor-
mation and communication component and indirectly
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impacted by each of the preceding ERM components
in the linear chain shown in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 6, which posits a positive relationship
between internal environment and management, is also
supported (b = 0.51, p < 0.001). As the internal environ-
ment improves, management improves in areas such as
general management consensus, better-informed deci-
sions, and increased accountability.
The model finds a 28% improvement in manage-
ment. A significant finding, this result reveals that an
ERM process leads to enhanced management of the
company, including better-informed decisions, greater
consensus, and better communication with manage-
ment. Furthermore, it appears that it is not the process
itself that is important. The real key is how the process
enables management to manage the company.
Hypothesis 7 posits a positive relationship between
enhanced management and improved perceived perfor-
Table 2. Indirect Effects on Internal Environment
Figure 1. Structural Model Results
Internal environment
Objective setting 0.189
Identification 0.288
Risk reaction 0.429
Oversight 0.575
Information and communication 0.777*
*Information and communication had a direct effect on a company’s internal environment. 
Management
R2 = 0.28
Monitoring
Information
& Communication
R2 = 0.61
Oversight
R2 = 0.55
Risk
Response
Risk
Assessment
Identification
R2 = 0.43
Objective
Setting
Perceived
Performance
R2 = 0.58
Risk Reaction
R2 = 0.45
Control
Activities
Internal
Environment
R2 = 0.52
H1: 0.65***
H2: 0.67***
H3: 0.74***
H7: 0.74***
H4: 0.74***
H5: 0.78***
H6: 0.51***
0.94***0.90*** 0.95*** 0.83***
***p<0.001
1  
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mance. The results support this hypothesis (b = 0.74, 
p < 0.001). As management gets better, there are
improved benefits of meeting strategic goals, reducing
earnings volatility, and increasing profitability. This is
also an important result. Our model shows that manage-
ment should want to implement ERM to improve per-
ceived performance. Yet the calls for greater risk over-
sight coming from governments and other regulatory
agencies have been met with the same response that
companies gave to government calls for increased con-
trols and financial reporting: Companies complain of
the costs associated with such programs. While this may
be an understandable response, managers should want
ERM because it improves their capability to manage.
The results show that none of the control variables
had an impact on perceived performance, but companies
outside the U.S. (p < 0.01), medium- and smaller-sized
companies (p < 0.001), and companies in the process of
implementing ERM (p < 0.01) are more likely to report
improved management decisions from the ERM
process. These significant results suggest that ERM may
improve risk management more visibly in medium and
smaller companies than in large companies. They may
also suggest that improvements in risk management may
occur most during the process of implementing ERM,
when everyone sees that the process is advancing,
instead of after ERM is in place and becomes part of an
accepted routine. These control variable results pose
interesting questions for future research.
THE IMPORTANCE OF A
STRUCTURED APPROACH
Our results show that the practical value of implement-
ing an ERM process can be seen in both enhanced
management and improved performance. In other
words, the value side of ERM is that it makes manage-
ment better. It leads to greater management consensus,
better-informed decision making, and increased
accountability. Better management translates into the
increased ability to meet strategic goals, reduced earn-
ings volatility, and increased profitability. Practically
speaking, it is hard to imagine a management team or
board of directors that would not want these benefits.
Following a structured and component approach to
risk management leads to both enhanced management
and improved performance. This approach is important
because companies need to first identify risks before
they can react to them. Similarly, once companies know
the risks related to their objectives and begin to react,
they can build better oversight and information process-
es related to the risks and, ultimately, make better deci-
sions to create or protect value.
Our model also shows that the causal chain of an
ERM process can lead to enhanced management and
improved performance. Specifically, as companies
implement an ERM process, the new knowledge it pro-
vides them about objectives, risks, oversight, informa-
tion and communication, and the internal environment
leads to enhanced management, as evidenced by
increased management consensus, better-informed
decisions, better communication with management
regarding risk taking, and increased management
accountability. This enhanced management, in turn,
leads to improved performance.
IMPLICATIONS
ERM is hard to study because companies are not
required to disclose their ERM processes. Even compa-
nies with some ERM disclosures may not fully reveal
their components or stage of ERM implementation.
Though there are limitations to our approach, we find
some interesting and significant results. Not only are
we first to document the relation between ERM com-
ponents and value, but we are also the first to show that
companies are getting value from implementing ERM.
The results suggest that an ERM framework and an
ERM implementation can help companies improve
performance by enabling executives to manage the
company better. From a practical standpoint, companies
ask how ERM adds value. Our results show that value
comes from implementing the process, which then
enables the company to make better decisions. Given
that implementing the components takes time, compa-
nies should be patient with finding immediate value.
Our measures for enhanced management coincide
with COSO’s 2009 recommendations for strengthening
ERM. Whereas COSO encourages interaction between
management and board members to discuss risk man-
agement philosophy and risk appetite, we noted that
enhanced management arises from the perceived bene-
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fit of ERM on building management consensus about
the risks it encounters. Developing a common under-
standing of risks, philosophy, and appetite among man-
agement and members of the board could facilitate
deeper dialogue. Where COSO recommends a better
understanding of risk management practices, our mea-
sure of perceived benefit of ERM from increased com-
pany management accountability suggests that it will be
easier for management to explain to board members the
key considerations of risks in relation to strategic objec-
tives. Where COSO enjoins board members to know
about the most significant risks and risk responses, our
measure of the perceived benefit of ERM provides
management with this capability by improving its abili-
ty to articulate and communicate risk taking to the
board and outside stakeholders. Finally, where COSO
recommends that board members review portfolio risks
in relation to risk appetite, our measure of the per-
ceived benefit of ERM on a company’s ability to make
better-informed decisions joins this most general objec-
tive of integrated risk management from ERM
processes.
These results should be encouraging to company
executives and boards that are trying to implement
ERM processes and the related idea of risk oversight.
Future research could explore the aspects of ERM and
the value from the process. Numerous papers have
attempted to measure value associated with corporate
governance or balanced scorecards. Other studies could
research similar approaches in ERM processes and dis-
colsures. Future research could also study the other
ERM framework components or compare COSO’s
ERM framework to other risk frameworks, such as
ISO’s risk framework. So that ERM survey and disclo-
sure research is not just testing a simulacrum of ERM,
additional field-based research should examine how
companies are implementing ERM processes and what
measures they change or create in order to measure and
manage their risks. Another area for future research is
international differences in ERM since numerous
economies around the world either mandate or strongly
suggest ERM and risk oversight. n
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